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I

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THOMAS C. MABEY and LOUISE S.
MABEY, his wife,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.
KAY PETERSON CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
INC., a Utah corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.
WASATCH CABINET COMPANY, INC.,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,

Case No.

18338

vs.
KAY PETERSON CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
INC., a Utah corporation, et al.,
Defendants.
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
The brief of the Respondents (Plaintiffs Thomas C. and Louise S. Mabey)
raises for the first time on appeal issues which are beyond the scope of
the brief of Appellant (Defendant Kay Peterson Construction Company, Inc.)
and which, it is submitted, Plaintiffs Mabey are not entitled to have heard
by this court.

In order to address these newly-raised issues and direct

the court's attention to the errors in Plaintiffs Mabey's arguments, Defendant Kay Peterson Construction respectfully submits this brief in reply.
For convenience and to maintain consistent terminology between this reply
brief and Defendant's previous brief, the parties will be referred to
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throughout as "Plaintiffs" or Mabeys
11

11

and

11

Defendant or "Kay Peterson
11

Construction."

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 2 -

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
HAVING FAILED EITHER TO APPEAL OR CROSS-APPEAL,
PLAINTIFFS (AS RESPONDENTS ON APPEAL) ARE
NOW PRECLUDED FROM ARGUING FOR AND ARE NOT ENTITLED TO
A REVERSAL OF THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING OF MUTUAL MISTAKE
At the close of trial, the trial court correctly and properly found,
.based upon the

ev~dence

presented, that there had been a mutual mistake in

the formation of the contract which was the subject of the litigation
between the parties.

Notwithstanding this finding (and as pointed out at

some length in Defendant's previous brief on appeal at Point I) the trial
judge erroneously failed to reform the contract and elected instead to
ignore the evidence presented to the court and award damages to both
parties based upon amounts prayed for in the pleadings.

An appeal was

properly and timely filed by the Defendant Kay.Peterson Construction.

No

appeal or cross-appeal was or has been filed by the Plaintiffs Mabey.
Nevertheless, the Plaintiffs have utilized the major portion of their
Respondent's Brief to argue that the trial court erred in finding a mutual
mistake and in granting judgment to the Defendant.

Moreover, Plaintiffs

have specifically indicated in their brief under the paragraph captioned
"Relief Sought on Appeal" that they "seek reversal of the court's judgment in favor of Defendant based upon an alleged mutual mistake of fact
•

11

(Resp. Br. at 3) .

It is the clear rule of law in Utah, as supported by numerous
decisions of this Court, that a party who seeks any relief on appeal
other than mere affirmation of the lower court judgment must present to
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this Court an appeal or cross-appeal designating that portion of the judgment whi ch i s a ppea 1ed fr om and the re 1i e f requested .

Ru 1e 74 ( b) of the

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that when one party files a notice
of appeal, other parties may cross-appeal without filing a notice of
appeal; however:
"such [other] party or parties shall file a statement of the
points on which he intends to rely on such cross-appeal
within the time and as required by subdivision (d) of Rule
75.
II

Rule 75(d) provides in pertinent part:
"If the respondent desires to cross-appeal, or if the
appellant has filed a statement of the points on which
he intends to rely and the respondent desires to have
the appellate court consider other or additional matters,
the respondent shall, within ten days after the service
and filing of appellant's designation, or if the parties
stipulate as to the record on appeal, within ten days from
the filing of such stipulation, serve and file a statement
of respondent's points, either by way of such cross-appeal
or for the purpose of having considered other or additional
matters than those raised by appellant." (Emphasis added.)

The failure of a respondent on appeal to file properly or timely a
cross-appeal results in waiver of the respondent's right to have the court
review or modify the trial court judgment.

In Terry vs. Zions Cooperative

Merchantile Institution, 617 P.2d 700 (Utah 1980), this court considered
on rehearing the issue of whether a respondent on appeal is entitled to
affirmative relief when no valid cross-appeal exists.

The plaintiff in

that case, Mrs. Terry, had obtained a judgment against the defendant,
Z.C.M.I., for damages resulting from false arrest and malicious prosecution.
The jury award of $15,000.00 punitive damages was reduced by the trial
judge to $2,000.00 and judgment was entered accordingly.

The defendant
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appealed from the lower court

judgmen~

against it and on appeal this court

reinstated the entire punitive damage award of $15,000.00.

On petition

for rehearing the defendant pointed out that the plaintiff was not entitled
to reinstatement of the punitive damage award, because the plaintiff had
not filed a valid cross-appeal from the lower court's judgment reducing
the award to $2,000.00.
had withdrawn

(Plaintiff had untimely filed a cross-appeal, but

the same after a motion to dismiss the cross-appeal was

made by the defendant.)
The plaintiff presented two arguments to this Court in response to
the defendant's claim that plaintiff was not entitled to have the punitive
damage award increased:
1.

Plaintiff could either cross-appeal or request the court in her

respondent's brief to reinstate the original amount of the verdict; and
2.

Because the defendant had appealed from the entire judgment,

including the award of punitive damages, plaintiff could address the entire
subject matter of the appeal without the necessity of a cross-appeal.
This court reviewed the plaintiff's contentions and rejected them
both holding:
"If he [the appellee] wishes to argue for alteration of the
judgment to enlarge his rights, he must file his own notice
of appeal or petition within the time provided by the rules,
i.e., in the usual parlance, he must file a cross-appeal or
cross-petition . . . .
What the plaintiff sought was to increase the punitive damages,
which thus constituted a request for an affirmative change
of the judgment for her benefit . . . . 11 Supra at 702 (emphasis by the court).
As a consequence of this holding the court reversed its order reinstating
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the entire punitive damage award and merely reaffirmed the trial court's
prior judgment.
The ruling in Terry that a respondent on appeal may not seek to
enlarge his own rights without first filing a cross-appeal, follows substantial precedent set in earlier Utah decisions.

In Hartford Accident

and Indemnity Company vs. Clegg, 103 Utah 414, 135 P.2d 919 (1943), this Court
refused to review assignments of error raised by the respondent who had
failed to file a cross-appeal, stating:
"No affirmative relief can be granted to respondent, even if
he were entitled to such, because no cross-appeal has been
filed.
103 Utah at 427 (emphasis added).
11

In his concurring opinion in Jensen vs. Freeman Gulch Mining Company,
109 Utah 163, 166 P.2d 250 (1946), Justice Wolfe observed that even though
the lower court judgment in favor of the plaintiff-appellant was unsupportable, it would be affirmed on appeal because the defendant had not filed
a cross-appeal (109 Utah at 171).

Compare also Peterson vs. Peterson, 112

Utah 554, 190 P.2d 135 (1948), and Reimann vs. Baum, 115 Utah 147, 203
P.2d 387 (1949), wherein this court refused to hear issues not properly
raised by cross-appeal.
There can be no doubt that Utah law imposes upon a respondent to
an appeal the responsibility to raise by cross-appeal any issue which will
result in affirmative relief or enlargement of rights on behalf of the
respondent.

If there is no cross-appeal, a respondent may only seek

affirmation of the lower court judgment.

The Utah rule requiring cross-

appeals is neither unusual nor extraordinary.

In fact, similar, if not
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identical, positions have been taken by the appellate courts in every
neighboring jurisdiction.
In Booras vs. Uyeda, 56 Ore.App. 834, 643 P.2d 413 (1982) the Oregon
appeals court had before it an appeal by the plaintiff from a lower court
judgment of money damages.

The plaintiff had brought an action in equity

against the defendant for specific performance on a contract.

The trial

court had found the contract to be valid and enforceable, but denied specific
performance on the ground it was "impractical, difficult and time consuming."
The plaintiff appealed from the damage award demanding that he be granted
specific performance on the contract instead.

No cross-appeal was filed

by the defendants; however, on appeal the defendants argued that the trial
court erred in finding the contract specifically enforceable because the
plaintiff had failed to prove a legally enforceable contract.

The plain-

tiff pointed out that the defendants could not challenge the court's
finding without having first cross-appealed.

In

acce~ting

the plaintiff's

contention and rejecting the defendants' argument, the court noted:
"It is well settled that, although this court reviews a case
in equity de novo, a respondent who has not cross-appealed
cannot obtain here a judgment more favorable to him and less
favorable to the appellant than the judgment entered below
(citing cases)." 643 P.2d at 413
In Maricopa County vs. Corporate Commission of Arizona, 79 Ariz. 307,
289 P.2d 183 (1955) the appellee attempted in its brief to attack the lower
court judgment without having filed a cross-appeal.

The Arizona Supreme

Court refused to consider the points raised by the appellee, holding
instead that where an appellee seeks by cross assignments in its brief
to attack a judgment with a view of either enlarging its own rights or
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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lessening the rights of its adversary, it must cross-appeal by conforming
with rules of court and by giving notice of such cross-appeal.

289 P.2d

at 185.
As to additional jurisdictions, see: Lepel vs. Lepel, 93 Idaho 82, 456
P.2d 249, 254 (1969) ("If a respondent, in an appeal, desires to have
errors against himself corrected, he must present them to [the appellate]
court by way of cross-appeal");

James vs. City of Pittsburg, 195 Kans.

462, 407 P.2d 503, 505 (1965) ("[The

successful party in the lower court

is required] to file a cross-appeal before he can present adverse rulings
for review"); Trollope vs. Koerner, 21 Ariz.App. 43, 515 P.2d 340, 343
(1973) ( [A]ppellants should not have recovered [any judgment] . . .
11

However, since no cross-appeal was taken by appellees, this Court is obliged
to affirm the damage award as handed down by the trial court"); Chavira vs.
Carnahan, 77 N.M. 467, 423 P.2d 988, 990 (1967) ("[A]ppellee has not filed
a cross-appeal and any objection to the trial court's instructions can
not be properly raised for consideration by way of his answer brief");
Board of County Commissioners of Arapahoe County vs. City and County of
Denver, 547 P.2d 249, 251 (Colo. 1976) ("[A]n appellee may not attack a
decree with a view either to enlarging his rights thereunder or lessening
the rights of his adversary unless a cross-appeal has been filed

11

);

Tindle

vs. Linville, 512 P.2d 176, 179 (Okla. 1973) ("Parties who fail to [crossappeal] are deemed to acquiesce in the judgment of the trial court.

They

cannot be heard, on appeal by others, to complain of errors below, and
can demand no relief from the appellate tribunal").
The comments advanced by the courts in refusing to hear or rule on
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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issues not properly raised by cross-appeal offer clear support for the
law in this jurisdiction; namely, a respondent who desires on appeal that
the reviewing court act other than to affirm the lower court decision, must
first file a cross-appeal, even if the lower court ruling is in error or
unsupportable.

This rule applied equally in equity cases where the facts

are reviewed by the appellate court and in cases at law, and cannot be
satisfied by merely raising arguments for the first time in the respondent's
brief.

Proper and timely filing of the pleadings and notices specified

in Rule 74(b) and 75(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is a mandatory
prerequisite to any claim by a respondent of error at the trial level.
Turning to the position of the Plaintiffs Mabey in the present
action as outlined in their respondents

1

brief, one notes 'that Plaintiffs

have specifically requested "reversal of the court s judgment in favor
1

of defendant based upon an alleged mutual mistake of fact

11

(Resp. Br. at

3) and that Plaintiffs have argued at some length (Point III; Resp. Br.
at 14 through 26) for such reversal, claiming the trial court erred in finding
mutual mistake.

A thorough review of the file and an examination of

the court docket indicates that not only have Plaintiffs failed to file
a timely or adequate cross-appeal, they have failed to file any sort
of cross-appeal at all!

It is obvious from their arguments against the

finding of mutual mistake, that Plaintiffs are requesting this court
to grant relief on appeal which, if granted, would enlarge their own
rights or lessen those of the Defendant Kay Peterson Construction.

Plain-

tiffs, due to their failure to cross-appeal, are not entitled to such
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relief, nor are they even entitled to a review of their claims or arguments.

This court should refuse to consider Plaintiffs

1

arguments against

mutual mistake, and should instead reform the contract to reflect the
intention of the parties, as the trial court failed to do.
With respect to the question of
pertinent.

reform~tion,

one final observation is

Plaintiffs have nowhere in their brief disputed or indicated

any opposition to the arguments advanced by the Defendant that the trial
court erred when it failed to reform the contract to the parties• understanding.

Moreover, Plaintiffs have not disputed in their brief Defendant's

contention that the proper remedy upon a finding of mutual mistake of
fact is reformation of the contract to reflect the intention of the parties.
Plaintiffs offer no legal authority or argument in their brief in support
of the trial court's award of damages both to the Plaintiffs and Defendant
in total disregard to the obvious consequences of the mutual mistake.

In

fact, having found mutual mistake in the formation of the contract, the
trial court's judgment thereon is totally unsupportable in the law.
Reformation of the contract is the proper remedy and judgment should be
entered by this Court accordingly.
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POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY AND PROPERLY FOUND
THAT THERE WAS A MUTUAL MISTAKE OF FACT
IN THE FORMATION OF THE WRITTEN CONTRACT
While it is the firm belief of the Defendant that the question of
whether the trial court erred in finding mutual mistake is not properly
before this Court, Defendant finds itself compelled nevertheless to respond
to the erroneous and misleading arguments advanced by the Plaintiffs in
their brief.

Contrary to the assertions of Plaintiffs, the evidence pre-

sented at trial not only clearly and convincingly establishes the mutual
mistake of the parties in the formation of the written contract, it stands
unopposed in support of that determination.

There is no contradictory

evidence in the record.
Plaintiffs have in the Respondents' Brief argued all around the
court's holding of mutual mistake, without ever addressing the issue
directly.

Plaintiffs have attempted to claim the issue was not properly

before the court (Resp. Br. Point III A, at 14-16).

They have argued that

the mistake was not "mutual" (Resp. Br. Point III B, at 16-17).

They have

alleged there was insufficient evidence of a mutual mistake (Resp. Br. Point
III C, at 18-20).

Finally they have claimed there was no mistake at all

(Resp. Br. Point III D, at 20-23).

None of Plaintiffs' arguments address

the obvious conclusion reached by the trial judge from the clear and
undisputed testimony given by both the Plaintiff, Mr. Mabey, and Defendant's
President, Kay Peterson; namely that the parties intended to enter into
a contract which would set forth the purchase price only of the improvements
on Lot 1, not of the lot itself (Plaintiff Mabey's testimony, T60-62;
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Defendant Peterson's testimony, T116-117).

The written contract in the

form of the Earnest Money Agreement (Pl. Ex. C) with the adjusted price
term did not, as a result of the mutual mistake of the parties, reflect
that intention.
Defendant in its previous brief and Plaintiffs in their brief have
both referred to the rule in Jensen vs. Manilla Corporation of the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 565 P.2d 63 (Utah 1977), which states
that a written instrument which fails to conform to what the parties intended
may be reformed by the court to reflect that intention.

Notwithstanding

the fact that Defendant in its previous brief meticulously and carefully
explained how the evidence at trial established the parties' intentions
(App. Br. A and Bat 14, 15), Plaintiffs have claimed in their brief that
Defendant failed to show what the parties intended.

In support of this

proposition Plaintiffs make the remarkable claim that the record does
not reflect the Plaintiffs' intention to pay $127,000.00 for the house
and improvements.

Admittedly the figure of $127,000.00 is an extrapolation

from the evidence presented to the court; however, the existence or nonexistence of that number in the evidence does not alter the real intentions
of the parties.

The record is replete with testimony establishing that

the contracting parties intended the purchase price to be whatever the
total construction cost of the home and the improvements was, less any
amounts attributable to the lot itself.

The uncontradicted, undisputed

evidence, in the form of the testimony of both Plaintiff Tom Mabey and
Defendant's President, Kay Peterson, confirms that:
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1.

The reduction in the original purchase price of $134,068.40 (which

price was agreed to on March 20, 1980) (Pl. Ex. C) was made because both
parties believed that figure included the full price of the lot ($27,000.00)
as well as the cost of the improvements.
2.

The reduced price of $109,000.00 was intended by the parties to

reflect the deletion of the total lot price (in the form of two payoff
amounts, $18,000.00 and $9,000.00) thought to be included in the $134,068.40
figure.
3.

In fact only the $9,000.00 lot payoff amount was included in the

$134,068.40.

4.

Had the contract actually reflected the parties' intention, the

purchase price of $134s068.40 (plus an approximate $2,000.00 increase
added by Tom Mabey as a

11

buffer

11
)

would have only been reduced by $9,000.00

instead of $27,000.00 as the parties actually proceeded to do.
The inescapable conclusion is:

the parties both intended the price

figure of the contract to evidence the cost of the home and improvements
only, and the reduced price figure on the contract of $109,000.00 did not
reflect that intention; it was $18,000.00 too low.
A clearer example of "mutual mistake" would be hard to find.

Jensen

vs. Manilla Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints,
supra.

The mutual mistake was obvious to the trial judge.

from the record.

It is obvious

Only the Plaintiffs appear confused on this issue.

trial court's finding should not be disturbed on appeal.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 11 -

The

POINT I I I.
PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO PRESENT AT TRIAL
ANY PROBATIVE EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH
A BASIS FOR AN AWARD OF DAMAGES
RESULTING FROM ALLEGED DEFECTIVE WORKMANSHIP
In Defendant's prior brief on appeal, Defendant pointed out that the
Plaintiffs had failed at trial to present any evidence on which an amount
for claimed damages resulting from alleged defective workmanship could
be established "with reasonably certainty."
the Respondents

1

Plaintiffs have argued in

Brief that the evidence presented concerning the amount

of damages (testimony of Mr. Mabey) was competent and credible, hence it
was also sufficient and reasonably certain (Resp. Br. Point I at 7-11).
Through such falacious reasoning Plaintiffs seek to perpetuate here the
error made by the trial court, which in awarding damages based on Mr.
Mabey•s testimony, apparently relied on what it viewed as "competent"
evidence to establish factual conclusions which must be based on "probative"
evidence.

The failure of Plaintiffs to grasp the distinction between

competent and probative evidence, both at trial and in their brief on
appeal, raises some concern that Plaintiffs' confusion may cloud this
Court's review of this matter.

The following discussion of the law is

presented with a view to clarifying the misconceptions which Plaintiffs
have attempted to propound.
Plaintiffs have correctly cited in their brief the rule on "reasonable
certainty" of damages stated by this Court in Security Development Company
vs. Fedco, 23 Utah 2d 306, 462 P.2d 706 (1969).

However, it is apparent

from a review of Plaintiffs' arguments that Plaintiffs have not only
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misunderstood the rule they cite, they have misapplied it as well.

Para-

phrasing the damage rule of Security Development, supra, it becomes:

a

damage amount need not be determined exactly, provided a reasonable basis
for calculation of the damage amount is afforded from the evidence.

As to

what constitutes a "reasonable basis for calculation," this Court in
Security Development referred with approval to the explanation offered by
the United States Supreme Court in Lavender vs. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645, 66 S.Ct.
740, 90 L.Ed. 916 (1945). That court in discussing jury determinations of
damages and the evidence necessary to support such verdicts noted:
"Only when there is a complete absence of probative facts
to support the conclusion reached does a reversible error
appear .
327 U. S. at 653 ( em phas i s added ) .
11

In other words, even though the rule of certainty in

damage awards allows

the amount of an award to be"approximate" or "inexact," it must ne.vertheless
be supported by "probative" evidence.
The concept of "probative" facts (as distinguished from "ultimate"
facts) and the concept of "probative" evidence as opposed to "reliable or
competent" evidence have been thoroughly explored in numerous court
opinions.

From those court decisions the following definitions may be

derived.

Considering first "probative" facts, they are that part of the

evidence from which ultimate and decisive facts may be inferred.

Ultimate

facts are those which the evidence (probative facts) proves at trial.
Ultimate facts are not the same as the evidence (probative facts) required
to prove those ultimate facts.

Brown vs. Hall, 226 N.C. 732, 40

(1946); Daniel vs. Gardner, 240 N.C. 249, 81 S.E.2d 660 (1954).

S.E.2d 412
Stated
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in another way, probative facts provide the basis from which the ultimate,
decisive facts may be deduced or concluded; they are not the ultimate facts
themselves.
Turning to the term

11

probative 11 as it is applied to evidence, the

courts have offered the following explanations.
"[Probative evidence is] testimony of substance and relevant
consequence not vague or uncertain . . . ['probative'] has
reference to the substance of the testimony generally and
not the credibility of the witness. 11 Liquor Control Commision
vs. Bartolas, 10 Ohio Misc. 225, 225 N.E.2d 859, 862 (1963)
(emphasis added).
"['Probative'] relates to the evidentiary value of the
testimony and other evidence in an analytical sense, having
depth and being more than merely superficial or speculative."
Sowers vs. Ohio Civil Rights Commission, 20 Ohio Misc. 115,
252 N.E.2d 463, 478 (1969).
The term "probative," therefore, as applied to evidence refers to the
adequacy or sufficiency of the evidence to support the ultimate factual
conclusion to be established.
Applying the concepts of "probative" facts and evidence to the rule
that damages may be approximate or inexact so long as there is a reasonable
basis for calculation thereof, it becomes clear that the rule really provides that the amount of damages is the "ultimate" fact which the finder
of fact must determine or establish from the probative facts, i.e., those
substantive parts of the evidence which establish a basis for calculating
and thereby determining that ultimate damage amount.

The need for

substance and depth in the facts presented as a basis for the damage
award, even when the award itself can only be approximate, is obvious
from the rule itself.

While the evidence must also be competent and
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credible, if its lacks substance or is merely superficial, it cannot be
"probative" and cannot support the ultimate fact in issue, namely the
amount of damages to be determined.
Analyzing the evidence presented by the Plaintiffs during the trial
of this cause in the light of the foregoing discussion, it is apparent
that Plaintiffs presented no probative evidence to the court at all.
The testimony of the Plaintiff Tom Mabey, offered to establish the alleged
damage amount, was couched in terms of the "ultimate" fact in issue only
(T-34,35).
Plaintiffs

Mr. Mabey testified that damages were "about $5,400.00. 11
presented~

probative facts, no evidence of substance, in

support of that claim to damage amount and Plaintiffs provided no
information or facts as a basis from which the damage amount could be
calculated or inferred.

Mr. Mabey did testify that his claimed damages

were figured at "about $17.00 an hour," however no evidence was provided
as to how the per hour rate related to the damage figure of $5,400.00.
In other words, what the Plaintiffs provided to the court as "evidence"
was the very factual conclusion (devoid of any supporting evidence) which
the court should have reached from the probative evidence which was not
provided.

As the United States Supreme Court has stated, "absence of

probative facts to support the conclusion reached [constitutes] reversible
error."

Lavender v. Kurn, supra at 653.

The trial court assumably and the Plaintiffs (as indicated by the
arguments in their brief on appeal) clearly failed to grasp and properly
apply the legal principles described herein.

Plaintiffs instead have
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presumed that "competent" evidence is the same as "probative" evidence and
have argued that if the evidence was competent, it must be sufficient.

The

definitions and discussions set forth herein clearly show the contradictory
and illogical nature of that position.

This court should not perpetuate

the error of Plaintiffs and the trial court.

The trial court's award of

damages must be reversed as being unsupported by the evidence.
One final observation should be made in connection with the issue
of damages for faulty workmanship.

The trial judge, in ruling for Plain-

tiffs on this issue, added the stipulation that the judgment in favor of
the Plaintiffs would be set aside if the Defendant satisfied the State
[Board of Contractors] relative to repairing the alleged defects "within
one month" (T-132).

The judge allowed that such an order could

11

complicate"

things, however his apparent intention in awarding such relief was to
provide the Defendant with motivation for making such repairs as the
State Board found necessary.

(The judge made it clear that the Defendant

need not satisfy the Plaintiffs in this regard.) (T-132.)

Although the

transcript of the court proceedings and the court's minute entry (R-37,
188) make no such reference, the judgment prepared by counsel for the
Plaintiffs added the further stipulation that the one month period would
be "30 days" and would run from the date of the trial (R-224).
The judgment was signed by the court on February 26, 1982 without
comment or change, following a hearing on Defendant's objections to
findings of fact and conclusions of law (R-45, 222).

Contrary to the

statement of facts in the brief of Plaintiffs (Resp. Br. at 7) Defendant
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contacted Plaintiffs relative to making repairs and was refused the
opportunity by Plaintiffs to do so.

Moreover, the matter of the repairs

was resolved to the satisfaction of the State Board of Contractors prior
to the date the judgment was actually signed by the court.
CONCLUSION
The Plaintiffs, as Respondents, are required under the rules of
procedure and the law of this jurisdiction to file an appeal or crossappeal if they wish modification of the trial court judgment in any
manner which may enlarge their rights or decrease those of the Defendant.
Their failure to comply with the rules and law in this regard precludes
them from any relief from the trial court finding of mutual mistake.
any case, the record of the proteedings below clearly establishes that
the trial court correctly and properly found that the parties' written
agreement did not reflect their intentions as a result of a mutual
mistake of fact.
The Plaintiffs failed to provide any probative evidence at trial
upon which the trial court could base an award for damages relative
to the alleged defective workmanship.

The trial court's judgment in

that regard must be reversed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3rd day of September, 1982.
JENSEN & LLOYD

W. Waldan Lloyd
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
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In

Attorney's Address:
870 Commercial Security Bank Tower
Number Fifty South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144-0457
Telephone: (801) 322-2300
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I served two (2) ·true and accurate copies of the
foregoing Appellant's Reply Brief upon counsel for the Plaintiffs and
Respondents, George S. Diumenti, Esq. of and for DIUMENTI, HARWARD

& NELSON by mailing the same, postage prepaid, to their offices at
505 South Main Street, Bountiful, Utah

84010.

DATED this 3rd day of September, 1982.
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